

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 RIO DE 03621 251613Z

65/73

ACTION IO-13

INFO OCT-01 ARA-06 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDA-07 CIAE-00 INR-07

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 EB-07 NRC-05 OES-06 DODE-00

ERDA-05 H-02 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 FEA-01 IOE-00 /114 W
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FM AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4183

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

USMISSION IAEA VIENNA PRIORITY

ERDA WASHDC PRIORITY

ERDA GERMANTOWN PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L RIO DE JANEIRO 3621

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y MAINLY PARAS 8 AND 9

DEPT PASS IO/SCT FROM USDEL IAEA

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: IAEA, AORG, OCON

SUBJ: IAEA 20TH GENERAL CONFERENCE: MEETING WITH USSR REPS,
SEPT 22, 1976 DURING IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE

1. MEETING WAS HELD BETWEEN DR. SEAMANS AND MOROKHOV AND OTHER MEMBERS US AND USSR DELEGATIONS TO IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST.

2. DR. SEAMANS OPENED MEETING BY STRESSING OUR CONTINUED STRONG SUPPORT OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS, AND REFERRED TO THE CURRENT STUDY DIRECTED BY THE PRESIDENT ON US EXPORT POLICIES, PARTICULARLY RELATING TO REPROCESSING AND WASTE DISPOSAL, ONE OF THE RESULTS OF WHICH EXPECTED TO BE ENHANCED US SUPPORT OF AGENCY.

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PAGE 02 RIO DE 03621 251613Z

3. MR. MOROKHOV STATED THERE WERE TWO ISSUES HE WISHED TO RAISE:

(1) THE DESIREABILITY OF INCREASING THE NUMBER OF NPT PARTIES, AND OF STRENGTHENING OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS, AND (2) WHAT POSITION SHOULD BE TAKEN WITH RESPECT TO EXPORTS TO NON-NPT PARTIES. HE ADVOCATED IN THIS CONNECTION THAT FULL FUEL CYCLE SAFEGUARDS SHOULD BE REQUIRED AS A CONDITION OF EXPORT, AND NOTED OTHER COUNTRIES ALSO HAD EXPRESSED THIS VIEW. IF SUCH A COMMON POLICY AMONG SUPPLIERS WAS ADOPTED, MORE TIME COULD THEN BE SPENT STRENGTHENING THE EFFICIENCY OF SAFEGUARDS. HE WENT ON TO SAY REGIONAL CENTERS AND STORAGE OF PLUTONIUM WOULD NOT PROVIDE THE NECESSARY SECURITY, AND SAID HE WAS PERPLEXED BY THE US POSITION IN SUPPORT OF THESE CONCEPTS.

4. DR SEAMANS SAID THESE ISSUES WERE AMONG THOSE BEING ADDRESSED IN THE US POLICY STUDY, AS WELL AS BY THE CONGRESS. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT POLICIES BE DEVELOPED WITH RESPECT TO SPENT FUEL, I.E., REPROCESSING AND WASTE DISPOSAL. IN ANY EVENT, IAEA SAFEGUARDS AND OTHER APPLICABLE SUPPLIER GUIDELINES WOULD APPLY TO ANY NUCLEAR TRANSFERS. HE MENTIONED OUR POSITION ON THE EARLIER PROPOSED KOREAN REPROCESSING PLANT, ON THE FRENCH-PAKISTAN REPROCESSING PLANT, AND THE PROVISIONS INCLUDED IN THE EGYPT/ISRAELI AGREEMENTS ON REPROCESSING AS REFLECTING OUR NEGATIVE ATTITUDE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL CAPABILITIES. ALTHOUGH THESE REFLECT STRONGER POSITIONS THAN TAKEN IN THE PAST, A FINAL POLICY HAS NOT YET BEEN ADOPTED.

5. MOROKHOV REITERATED THAT THE SOVIET POSITION WAS TO REQUIRE FULL FUEL CYCLE SAFEGUARDS AS A CONDITION OF SUPPLY. HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO REQUIRE FULL FUEL CYCLE SAFEGUARDS ON HEAVY WATER THEY PLAN TO SUPPLY TO INDIA, SINCE THERE WAS NOT UNIVERSAL AGREEMENT AMONG SUPPLIERS FOR THIS APPROACH THEY WOULD REQUIRE STRICT SAFEGUARDS ON THE TRANSFER, BUT COULD NOT GO FURTHER. MOROKHOV CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THE SUPPLIERS GROUP SHOULD TAKE UP THE GENERAL QUESTION OF FULL FUEL CYCLE SAFEGUARDS IN LONDON.

6. DR. SEAMANS SAID WE WOULD CONSIDER THE SOVIET POSITION IN DEVELOPING OUR POSITION ON THE SUBJECT.

7. MOROKHOV NEXT REFERRED TO THE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF SAFEGUARDS BY THE IAEA. HE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 RIO DE 03621 251613Z

(1) THE SAFEGUARDS DEPARTMENT IS INEFFICIENT, AND THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG AGENCY OFFICIALS IN THIS AREA INVOLVE AN ABNORMAL DEGREE OF FRICTION, (2) THE NUMBER OF SAFEGUARDS INSPECTIONS BY THE AGENCY ARE TOO LOW FOR THOSE ALLOWABLE, (3) DIFFERENT PROCEDURES ARE USED IN THE SAME (OPERATIONS) DIVISION FOR THE SAME TYPES OF FACILITIES, (4) APPLICATIONS DEVELOPED BY THE DEVELOPMENT DIVISION ARE NOT USED BY THE OPERATIONS DIVISION, (5) THE CREATION OF A SECOND DIVISION OF OPERATIONS WAS PROBABLY NECESSARY, BUT

HE IS NOT CERTAIN IT WILL SOLVE THE PROBLEMS. HE THOUGHT THE DIVISIONS SHOULD BE ORGANIZED FUNCTIONALLY RATHER THAN GEOGRAPHICALLY. MOROKHOV SUGGESTED THAT ANOTHER COMMITTEE SIMILAR TO THE "7 WISEMEN" (GLENNAN SERVED ON THIS FOR THE US) BE CREATED TO REVIEW AND ADVISE ON THE AGENCY'S SAFEGUARDS ORGANIZATION.

8. DR. SEAMANS RESPONDED THAT HE WAS GLAD TO GET MOROKHOV'S VIEWS. HE NOTED THAT THE AGENCY WAS TAKING ON EXPANDED RESPONSIBILITIES AND HAD A VERY DIFFICULT JOB TO DO, ALTHOUGH HE HAS NOT HAD A CHANCE TO GO INTO DETAIL ON THE AGENCY'S SAFEGUARDS ORGANIZATION/ADMINISTRATION. HE SAID WE SHARED THE SOVIET'S OBJECTIVE OF EFFECTIVE ADMINISTRATION OF SAFEGUARDS, AND WOULD DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH DR. TAPE. HE ALSO PLANNED TO DISCUSS THE SUGGESTION FOR ANOTHER COMMITTEE TO REVIEW SAFEGUARDS ORGANIZATION WITH DRS. TAPE AND GLENNAN.

9. MOROKHOV, IN CONCLUSION, RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE FUTURE OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL, NOTING THAT EKLUND'S CURRENT TERM ENDS ON DECEMBER 1, 1977. HE SAID THAT STABILITY OF LEADERSHIP WAS IMPORTANT, AND SINCE THE SOVIETS DO NOT HAVE A STRONG, EFFECTIVE REPLACEMENT TO SUGGEST, AND HAVE CONFIDENCE IN EKLUND, THEY WERE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO SUPPORT HIM FOR A FOURTH TERM. AT THE SAME TIME, CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO A REPLACEMENT IN THE FUTURE. MOROKHOV SUGGESTED THAT THOUGHT BE GIVEN TO APPOINTING A DEPUTY TO THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OR A NEW INSPECTOR GENERAL WHO COULD EVENTUALLY REPLACE EKLUND.

10. DR. SEAMANS REPLIED THAT THE US DOES NOT HAVE A POSITION ON THIS MATTER YET, BUT THAT IF EKLUND IS REPLACED IT SHOULD BE BY A VERY ABLE PERSON. HE WONDERED IF THERE MIGHT BE MERIT IN APPOINTING A DEPUTY TO EKLUND FOR ONLY ONE OR TWO YEARS PRIOR TO REPLACING HIM. MOROKHOV REPLIED THAT THE AGENCY STATUTE DID NOT PROVIDE FOR APPOINTING A DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR LESS THAN FOUR

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 RIO DE 03621 251613Z

YEARS. DR. SEAMANS INDICATED HE WOULD MENTION THIS GENERAL SUBJECT TO DR. TAPE.

11. MOROKHOV CONCLUDED BY INDICATING HE WOULD CONTINUE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE US.
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